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With US President Trump in office for half a year now, some people are still 
hoping that he will back away from his proclaimed protectionist policies. 
 Given the current mood of populism in the United States, however, we cannot 
assume that Trump will yield to the pressure from domestic companies with 
a strong stake in China and return to some kind of “realpolitik.” As a result, 
trade protectionism, investment barriers, and competition over global techno-
logical leadership will likely increase under the Trump administration, open-
ing up new space for cooperation between the European Union and China.
 • Populists in the United States are blaming globalisation for the loss of jobs and 
rising economic insecurity. They want to halt the shift of global economic power 
in favour of other countries. 
 • Trump is accusing China of profiting disproportionally from global free trade. 
China–US trade disputes within the World Trade Organization framework can 
be expected to intensify. Concurrently, bilateral trade agreements are preferred 
by the Trump administration, as it believes the United States can reap trade 
benefits more effectively this way.
 • The United States will strengthen its request for better access to the Chinese 
market, while Chinese direct investment in the United States will come under 
more pressure. We can expect that China’s acquisitions of US companies with 
sensitive technology will be further restricted. 
 • The US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is expected to 
lead to a decrease in US economic influence in Asia. The Trump administration 
seems to prioritise the short-term satisfaction of its populist clientele over the 
long-term impact on US competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific region.
Policy Implications
Under the Trump administration, we can expect that tension in US–China eco­
nomic relations will increase. While the United States will remain an important 
economic partner of the European Union, the latter should use the window of 
opportunity to strengthen its trade and investment relations with China. Con­
cluding the EU–China Investment Agreement will be an important step in this 
direction. In the light of Trump’s “America First” policy, the Chinese side might 
be more willing to enter into this agreement, which will protect investments and 
facilitate greater market access for European companies.
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Little Hope for “Realpolitik” 
In her testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 
2015, Melanie Hart, director of China Policy at the Center for American Progress, 
described the US policy towards China as following a multitrack approach. It “en -
ables the United States to push back against problematic actions as needed without 
curtailing overall US–China cooperation. This is a realpolitik, eyes-wide-open ap-
proach to engagement” (Hart 2015). One and a half years later, the new US govern-
ment clearly favours an “America First” policy approach and seems to be preparing 
for a trade conflict. Citing President Trump, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson 
underlined in his remarks at the US–China Summit on 6–7 April 2017 that the 
“chief goal of our trade policies is the prosperity of the American worker. To that 
end, we will pursue economic engagement with China that prioritises the economic 
well-being of the American people” (US Department of State 2017). 
Despite this tough stance towards China, Chinese media maintained their ra -
ther optimistic attitude. Since Trump’s election, both official and unofficial Chinese 
commentaries on the Trump administration’s foreign policy have been based on 
the expectation that the president will take a pragmatic and transactional approach 
to the Sino–American relationship. When it comes to economic and trade policy, 
however, the drawbacks of the bilateral relationship are stressed by the Chinese 
government. Speaking at a press conference on the occasion of the Fifth Session 
of the 12th National People’s Congress on 3 March 2017, Prime Minister Li Keqiang 
warned that in the case of a trade war between China and the United States, foreign-
invested companies, especially US firms, will bear the consequences.     
Judging by the “Joint Release: Initial Results of the 100-Day Action Plan of the 
U.S.–China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue,” published on 11 May 2017 by the 
US Department of Commerce, the results of that action plan are relatively unimpres-
sive. Although the plan covers 10 broad areas, including agricultural trade, financial 
services, investment, and energy (US Department of Commerce 2017), there are no 
agreements on larger issues. Critics point out that issues such as China’s steel and 
aluminium overcapacities and its restrictions on technology and unequal treatment 
vis-à-vis US firms were not touched upon. 
Finding a compromise solution for the more sensitive trade and investment is-
sues between China and the United States, however, seems difficult in light of the 
“America First” policy of President Trump. This populist message, which made his 
election campaign so successful, was based on the changes in the socio-econom-
ic context in the United States. Following Inglehart and Norris (2016), the global 
rise of populism can be explained by the growing economic inequality caused by a 
comprehensive transformation of the workforce and by the cultural backlash to a 
progressive value change. The authors assume that the two sets of changes might 
have reinforced each other. In the case of the United States, China was blamed for 
the loss of US jobs and the increase in social insecurity. Halting the shift of global 
economic power in favour of China was one of Trump’s campaign pledges. 
That China’s competitive pressure on US manufacturing industries played a 
role in Trump’s electoral victory has been shown in various studies of voting pat-
terns in US counties where Chinese imports have risen markedly in the last decade. 
One of these studies claims that the rising import competition from China contrib-
uted to a shift in voting towards candidates representing ideological extremes in 
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those districts, a phenomenon that particularly benefitted Republican candidates 
(Autor et al. 2016a). The Democrats would have gained a majority of votes in the 
states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania if the growth of import competi-
tion from China had been only half as large as observed. In contrast, in areas with 
fewer Chinese imports the “China effect” was marginal. 
Against this backdrop, we presume that there is little hope for realpolitik. Due 
to the changes in the political landscape and the current mood of populism, the 
Trump administration is going to call into question existing trade relations with 
its major economic partners, including bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade 
agreements. China will be the focus of the attempt to redirect trade policies in fa-
vour of the US economy. This is the clear message of “The President’s 2017 Trade 
Policy Agenda,” introduced in March 2017, which says that “while the current global 
trading system has been great for China, since the turn of the century it has not 
generated the same results for the United States” (USTR 2017). In order to deliver 
substantial improvement to those regions and workers in the United States disfa-
voured by the increase of globalisation, particularly because of China’s import pres-
sure, the current US government will be more assertive and prepared to enforce its 
“America First” policy.    
US–China Trade Relations Under Fire
Over the last three decades, US–China trade relations have grown rapidly and be-
come very complex. The countries are now mutually dependent. China is the biggest 
source of US imports, its third-largest export market, and its second-largest mer-
chandise trading partner. The Chinese market was by far the fastest-growing one 
for US exports, increasing more than fivefold between 2001 and 2016. Total exports 
amounted to USD 155.8 billion by 2016. US imports from China grew fourfold dur-
ing the same period. Starting from a higher baseline, the total imports went up to 
USD 462.8 billion, resulting in a US trade deficit of USD 347 billion in 2016 (see 
Table 1). This deficit with China is significantly larger than that with any other US 
trading partner and has repeatedly been used to criticise China for its unfair trade 
practices. 
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US Imports 1.1 15.2 100.1 365.0 399.4 425.6 440.4 468.5 483.2 462.8
US Trade 
Balance
+2.7 -10.4 -83.8 -273.0 -295.3 -315.1 -318.7 -344.9 -367.2 -347.0
Critics of this trade deficit point to the bilateral trade structure as a sign of the 
declining competitiveness of the United States compared to China’s rising competi-
tive position. US imports from China mainly consist of industrial products. The top 
five products are communications equipment, computer equipment, miscellaneous 
manufactured commodities (such as toys and games), apparel, and semiconductors 
and other electronic components. Among the imports from China, advanced tech-
nology products (ATP) represent a large and growing share. Trade in this category 
Table 1  
US–China Merchan-
dise Trade: 1980–
2016, in billion USD 
Source: US Interna­
tional Trade Commission 
(USITC) DataWeb, in: 
Morrison 2017: 3.
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increased from USD 21 billion in 2003 to USD 114.2 billion in 2016. Currently, 
more than one-third of total ATP imports into the United States come from China. 
Information and communications technology (ICT) products account for the lar -
gest share of these imports. By contrast, US agricultural exports occupy a central 
position in trade with China, which represents the second-largest market for US 
agricultural exports. In 2016 the value of US exports of oil seeds and grains (mainly 
soya beans) was higher than the export value of aerospace products (mainly civilian 
aircraft and parts), which belong to the second-most important product category. 
Other major US exports to China were motor vehicles, semiconductors and elec-
tronic components, and navigational, measuring, medical, and controlling instru-
ments (Morrison 2017: 4, 8–9). 
Academic discussion in the United States has partly supported the “2017 Trade 
Policy Agenda” of the Trump administration by complaining that imports from Chi-
na have market-distorting effects in the United States. One example is a study by 
Autor, Dorny, and Hanson (2016), entitled “The China Shock.” It shows American 
workers in regions that were particularly affected by Chinese import competition 
suffering from unemployment and economic insecurity. These workers rarely found 
adequate substitutes for job losses; their income generally shrank. They often be-
came ill, had difficulties finding a spouse, and died earlier. Another study (Autor 
et al. 2016b) found an additional negative impact of the market-distorting imports 
from China – namely, the reduction of R&D spending by US companies. Not many 
US firms tried to be more innovative in response to Chinese import penetration. 
Although the aforementioned studies have been criticised for their methodological 
limitations, they provided important arguments for the Trump administration to 
re-evaluate the gains and losses related to liberalised trade.
In the “2017 Trade Policy Agenda,” fairness in trade relations plays a crucial 
role. The goal is to have trade relations that are “freer and fairer for all Americans,” 
promote jobs in the United States, strengthen the national manufacturing base, and 
expand US agricultural and service-industry exports. The policy agenda stresses 
that these goals will be better achieved through bilateral rather than multilateral 
negotiations, including the renegotiation and revision of existing trade agreements. 
Major areas of concern include restrictions that US industrial and agricultural ex-
ports face abroad, unfair advantages through subsidies, theft of trade secrets, and 
currency manipulation. The “2017 Trade Policy Agenda” singled out China as one 
of the major sources of the US decline of manufacturing production and jobs and 
announced its intention to renegotiate trade agreements with China, South Korea, 
and Mexico. Within the WTO, the Trump administration appears to reinforce the 
WTO dispute settlement against China’s unfair trade practices. However, the ad-
ministration does not want the multilateral trading system to restrict American sov-
ereignty over its own trade policy. The “2017 Trade Policy Agenda” underlines that 
if the WTO dispute settlement body rules against the United States, this would “not 
automatically lead to a change in the US law or practice.” Although the US admin-
istration has not yet started to employ its new policy agenda, changes could come 
about quickly. The American trade law provides the president with broad author-
ity to implement trade-related measures such as terminating trade agreements or 
imposing punitive duties for a period of up to 150 days without involving Congress. 
If this should happen, however, the Chinese trade negotiators would certainly 
retaliate as they have in the past. When former US president Barack Obama an-
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nounced new duties on imports of Chinese tires under Section 421 of US trade law, 
the Chinese authority retaliated within 48 hours by initiating anti-dumping investi-
gations of US cars and poultry. While conflicts within the WTO-sanctioned tit-for-
tat are not something trade experts are worried about, it is the bypassing of WTO 
rules that could lead to a trade war between America and China. Should the Trump 
administration apply punitive tariffs to China, for example, foreign experts expect 
an immediate retaliation that would be directed at imports of strategic importance 
for the United States, such as soya beans.
Slowdown of US Investments in China
US–China investment relations have been growing rapidly, and so have the discus-
sions over investment restrictions in each other’s markets. China’s investment in 
the United States includes the holdings of securities, corporate investment (for-
eign direct investment, FDI), and other non-bond investments (Morrison 2017: 18). 
At the end of 2016, China held nearly USD 1.06 trillion in US Treasury securities, 
making it the second-largest foreign US Treasury securities holder. Following the 
United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission report, Chinese 
holdings of US government securities do not constitute a security risk for the United 
States. When China reduced these holdings recently there was only a limited impact 
on the US economy.  
The fast increase of Chinese investment in the US corporate sector is, however, 
a subject of greater concern. Based on statistics from the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), the main US government agency responsible for collecting and re-
porting data on FDI flows to and from the United States, US companies invested 
USD 7.3 billion in China in 2015; this was 4.2 per cent less than in 2014. China 
was the tenth-largest destination of US FDI outflows. At the same time, Chinese 
FDI flows to the United States are rapidly catching up and accounted for USD 5.1 
billion in 2015, an increase of 155.2 per cent over 2014. China was the twelfth-
largest source of US FDI inflows in 2015 (Morrison 2017: 21). The stock of US FDI in 
China (accumulated investment) is much higher than vice versa, since China’s out-
ward direct investment is a relatively new phenomenon. Estimates on Chinese FDI 
stocks in the United States vary greatly across different agencies. Data on Chinese 
investment stocks published by the Rhodium Group, a private consulting firm, are 
significantly higher than BEA estimates, but point to similar trends in US–China 
investment relations. While Chinese corporate investment in the United States has 
been growing strongly since the financial crisis, US FDI in China remains below 
2008 levels. 
The US government ascribes the stagnant investment level to restrictions on 
market access in China. Many US business groups believe there has been an uptick 
in protectionism in China. According to a survey by the US–China Business Coun-
cil (USCBC) in 2016, the main reason that companies reduced or halted planned 
investment in China in the past year was the perception of increasing restrictions 
on market access. The China business-climate survey conducted by the American 
Chamber of Commerce in China (2016) found that 16 per cent of the survey re-
spondents, especially those in the technology and R&D-intensive sectors and ser-
vices, saw market-access barriers or government policies that disadvantage foreign 
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companies as being the primary reason for a decline of their investment in China. 
More than three-quarters (77 per cent) of the respondents perceived foreign busi-
nesses in China as being less welcome than before. Compared to the 2013 survey, in 
which the corresponding share was 41 per cent, the perception of the respondents 
became significantly more negative. A large majority of companies expected that 
the US–China bilateral investment treaty (BIT), which has been under discussion 
since 2008, would improve the situation. US industry hopes that the BIT will lead 
to more transparency, predictability, and a level playing field with domestic Chinese 
companies, and that it will limit the use of industrial policies that created market-
access barriers for foreign companies.
There is also growing concern that China’s programmes for the promotion of 
indigenous innovation will discriminate against American companies in China. To 
reduce the country’s dependence on foreign technology and transform China from a 
global centre of low-tech manufacturing into a major centre of innovation, the Chi-
nese government introduced its Made in China 2025 programme in 2015. This pro-
gramme can be regarded as a continuation of the National Medium- and Long-Term 
Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020), which also fo-
cused on the strengthening of China’s indigenous innovative capabilities. Although 
the Chinese central government promised that measures linking innovation policies 
to government procurement preferences would be forbidden, US companies are 
still concerned over whether foreign intellectual property rights can be protected 
(Morrison 2017: 33–34). Another concern is China’s restriction on ICT, which the 
Chinese justify by citing national security issues, but which US companies view as a 
strategy to limit the growth of US ICT companies (such as cloud computing) operat-
ing in China. 
More Restrictions on Chinese Investment in the United States 
Restrictions on Chinese corporate investment in the United States have been 
stepped up. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 
is authorised to review transactions that could result in control of a US business 
by a foreign investor. Investigations are conducted in order to determine the effect 
of such transactions on US national security. Over the last few years, acquisitions 
of US assets, particularly of US technology firms by Chinese companies, became 
the main target of CFIUS investigations. Between 2012 and 2014, transactions by 
Chinese investors represented 19 per cent of the total number of reviewed transac-
tions. About half of the investigations were conducted in the manufacturing sector 
(Jackson 2017: 20). 
According to the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), 
an influential US think tank, CFIUS and its investment review process should be 
reformed. In the hearing on “Chinese Investment in the United States,” the presi-
dent of ITIF, Robert D. Atkinson, estimated that at least one-third of the investment 
comes from Chinese state-owned enterprises that are guided and supported by the 
Chinese government to target industries of strategic importance for the national 
security of the United States or its economic leadership. Atkinson argues that many 
acquisitions only serve the aim of taking over US technology in order to gain global 
market shares. He offers a simple solution to that challenge: “Without access to 
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US technology and know-how, the process by which China gains and ultimately 
surpasses the United States in technology capabilities will be delayed substantially” 
(ITIF 2017: 2). Along the same lines reads a Pentagon report commissioned by the 
former secretary of defence, which points out that Chinese companies invested ap-
proximately USD 30 billion into early-stage technology through more than 1,000 
funding deals between 2010 and 2016. China became an important participant in 
total venture deals; its share rose to approximately 10 per cent. The investment 
focused on strategic technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics and 
has potential military applications. In the battle for global leadership in science 
and technology it can be expected that the United States will continue to push for 
mutual access and equal treatment in investment relations with China, support 
analytical competence within the US administration, and cooperate with its allies 
in the design of policy measures that “constrain mercantilist-inspired Chinese FDI” 
(ITIF 2017: 3).   
In sum, we expect that bilateral investment relations will undergo significant 
changes as well. On the one hand, the Trump administration will certainly increase 
the pressure on China in terms of allowing US investors access to the Chinese mar-
ket, lifting barriers to entering still-protected industries, and solving conflicts over 
technology licensing between the United States and China (ITIF 2017: 7). On the 
other hand, CFIUS’s investigations might be extended to include 1) the impact of 
acquisitions by Chinese investors on US economic and technology leadership in 
strategic industries and 2) investment activities of Chinese venture capital funds. 
US experts distinguish the new approach with China from approaches with other 
countries. China’s corporate investment in high-tech industries follows the strat-
egy of global knowledge acquisition. This works to the disadvantage of the United 
States: “When you compare it with Japan, the differences are obvious: China is a lot 
bigger economy, it’s not an ally, and it’s not a democracy. The plans coming out of 
the Chinese government and the statements coming out of the Chinese leadership 
have a clear mercantilist bent and connection to China’s national-security strategy” 
(Kuo 2017).   
A Growing Economic Role for China in the Asia-Pacific Region? 
While increasing frictions are to be expected in the areas of US–China trade and 
investment relations, the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
one of the first policy decisions undertaken by President Trump, could lead to a 
relaxation of existing tensions in the bilateral relationship. This decision was ex-
plained in “The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda” as a clear signal that “the 
United States would take a new approach to trade issues.” The agenda announced 
that “bilateral talks with the remaining TPP countries” will be started to negotiate a 
new agreement (USTR 2017: 6). Most analysts agree that the withdrawal from TPP 
will reduce US influence in Asia and work in favour of China as the regional power. 
As Asia has, economically speaking, long been the fastest-growing region in 
the world, the US administration under President Bush began talks in 2008 on a 
regional trade agreement between the United States and 11 countries in the Asia-
Pacific region, which subsequently morphed into the TPP. Under the Obama ad-
ministration, the TPP became part of the larger “Pivot to Asia” policy that aimed 
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to strengthen the position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific. The implication 
is beyond US economic interests in the region. That China was excluded from par-
ticipation in the TPP was seen as a signal to China that the United States wanted to 
use trade agreements as a means to contain China. In line with this approach is the 
comment by former president Obama in 2015 that the “TPP allows America – and 
not countries like China – to write the rules of the road in the twenty-first century” 
(Ford 2017). One of the key objectives of the TPP was the creation of a “level play-
ing field” for US companies in the Asia-Pacific region. The negotiation covered a 
wide range of topics, including certain restrictions on state-owned enterprises, the 
introduction of market rules, protection of foreign investors against unfair govern-
ment procurement contracts and infringement on intellectual property rights, and 
the enhancement of social and labour protection standards. The exclusion of China 
from this agreement would have worked to China’s disadvantage.
The economic benefits to the United States from the TPP would have been mani -
fold. First, the total benefit from trade integration has been projected to grow from 
USD 5 billion in 2015 to USD 14 billion in 2025. With the TPP seen as a pathway to 
an Asia-Pacific free trade agreement and under the assumption that Canada, Japan, 
and Mexico would join as well, the size of the market and thus the economic benefit 
for the United States would have been even larger. In addition to benefits coming 
from regional trade integration, US services exports would have also been expected 
to strongly increase. A positive impact was also projected for the manufacturing 
sector and for small businesses. Most of all, the TPP would have strengthened US 
leadership in setting trade and investment rules in the region.
Given the huge strategic and economic benefits related to the TPP, why then 
was President Trump so eager to withdraw from the agreement? After all, the TPP 
was supported not only by many liberals – because labour rights and environmental 
protections were included in the agreement – but also by strong lobbying groups 
such as the US Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufactur-
ers. At a press conference, Trump gave an explanation that was in line with the new 
policy approach, arguing that existing trade agreements would not protect jobs in 
the United States: “We’re going to stop the ridiculous trade deals that have taken 
everybody out of our country and taken companies out of our country, and it’s go-
ing to be reversed.” Trade agreements, he said, would only be made with individual 
allies in the future (Baker 2017). The withdrawal from the TPP has a number of 
implications for the United States. We believe not only that the 11 would-be partner 
countries from the Asia-Pacific are disappointed in the decision but also that this 
step will increase those countries’ doubts about the role of US leadership in the 
region. The Trump administration’s retreat could be the cause of more economic 
and political tension among the countries in Asia and work against the strategic US 
interests of shaping the region based on liberal values and open markets.   
Critical comments on Trump’s decision to withdraw from the TPP point to the 
negative impact on the US economic position in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the 
heading “The Death of TPP: The Best Thing that Ever Happened to China,” Wayne 
and Magnusson (2017) pointed to the missed opportunity to reinvigorate US trade 
and economic influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on World Bank trade data 
for the region, they showed that at least 17 countries in the Asia-Pacific increased 
their imports from China, while decreasing their imports from the United States. 
Canada, Japan, and Mexico were among the countries whose trade balance shifted 
   9    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 4 | JULY 2017 
in favour of China. The TPP could have supported the recovery of the US economic 
position vis-à-vis these countries. 
In sum, the withdrawal from the TPP demonstrates that the Trump adminis-
tration is not striving for a realpolitik approach, but wants most of all to execute 
its populist campaign pledges. Instead of expanding its long-term influence in the 
Asia-Pacific region, the Trump administration seems to prioritise the short-term 
satisfaction of its domestic clientele. 
Policy Implications for the European Union 
Trump’s “America First” policy calls the existing structure of economic relations 
with China into question. With the United States and China being among the most 
important trading partners of the European Union, any US restrictions on trade 
with China will be felt in the European countries. China is strongly involved in the 
global value chain, and many European companies have production sites in China. 
Therefore, an increase of tariff and non-tariff barriers by the United States would 
represent a challenge for European outward-oriented economies, especially Ger -
many. Based on estimates, approximately 80 per cent of global trade is supply-
chain trade, making the traditional calculation of national trade deficits obsolete. 
Seen from the European perspective, trade competition from China is putting 
pressure on European companies, but the growing Chinese market also provides 
huge opportunities for European suppliers. Given the competitive pressure from 
China, national governments within the European Union should continue to sup-
port the industrial restructuring of those regions with outdated industries that are 
facing challenges posed by globalisation and by China. Most European countries 
have no reservations employing policies that would engender economic restructur-
ing. By contrast, an active industrial policy is not very popular in the United States. 
Under the Trump administration, the United States will be further “protected” 
against foreign competition. Although a more protectionist policy is welcomed in 
those Midwestern and Southern states that elected Trump in 2016, this policy will 
not solve the structural problems and the decline of US competitiveness.  
The European Union should strongly support the WTO’s function as the most 
important global institutional structure that provides the means to deal with trade 
conflicts between the European Union and China. The investment relations with 
China can be improved by concluding the EU–China Investment Agreement, which 
has been under negotiation since 2013. This agreement will not only protect invest-
ments but also facilitate greater access to the Chinese market. In his speech at the 
Davos Forum, Xi Jinping already announced that some of the barriers for European 
countries to the Chinese market will be removed. Most experts expect that China 
will be more willing to compromise on some of the most controversial topics of the 
agreement. In contrast to the short-term gain approach that the Trump administra-
tion is pursuing in order to satisfy its populist clientele, the European Union should 
follow a long-term strategy in its relations with China. This would include not only 
a free trade agreement further down the line, but also closer cooperation in science 
and technology.  
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